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Bankruptcy

by Hon. James D. Walker, Jr.*
and Amber Nickell**
Since last year's article, the courts in the Eleventh Circuit have
issued-with a few exceptions-mostly routine bankruptcy opinions. The
United States Supreme Court, however, has been very busy, deciding six
bankruptcy-related cases. It makes sense to begin with one of the most
anticipated of those opinions.
I.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The Supreme Court held in Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v.
Hood1 that a student loan dischargeability proceeding under § 523(a)(8)
of the Bankruptcy Code 2 is not a suit within the meaning of the
Eleventh Amendment3 and is, thus, not subject to a defense of sovereign
immunity.4 Rather, it comes within the scope of the bankruptcy court's
in rem jurisdiction.5 In so holding, the Court avoided the question of
whether Congress has the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity
in bankruptcy.6
Writing for a 7-2 majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained,
"Bankruptcy Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over a debtor's property,
* U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, Middle and Southern Districts of Georgia. Augusta State
University (B.A., 1970); University of South Carolina (J.D., 1974). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
** Law Clerk, The Honorable James D. Walker, Jr. Chapman University (B.A., 1993);
Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2001). Member,
Mercer Law Review (1999-2001); Managing Editor (2000-2001). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
1. 124 S. Ct. 1905 (2004).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to the
Bankruptcy Code, which is codified at Title 11 of the United States Code, and all rule
references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
4. 124 S. Ct. at 1909.
5. Id. at 1910.
6. Id. at 1914-15.

1101

MERCER LAW REVIEW

1102

[Vol. 55

wherever located, and over the estate."7 In a footnote, he indicated that
there may be some instances in which the court's in rem jurisdiction
intrudes upon state sovereignty.8 However, in the case of student loan
dischargeability, "[a] debtor does not seek monetary damages or any
affirmative relief from a State by seeking to discharge a debt; nor does
he subject an unwilling State to a coercive judicial process."' Therefore,
the state's sovereignty is not offended.' °
The dissent, after first asserting that "Congress lacks authority to
abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Bankruptcy Clause,""
argued that while the in rem exception to sovereign immunity may be
appropriate for matters initiated by motion, it should not apply to
adversary proceedings, which are similar to civil litigation. 2 Unlike
motion practice, adversary proceeds require, among other things, a
complaint, service of process, and an answer. 3 It is a coercive process
subject to the Eleventh Amendment because "[iun order to preserve its
rights, the State is compelled either to subject itself to the Bankruptcy
Court's jurisdiction or to forfeit its rights."' 4
The majority countered that the dissent is elevating form over
substance." The granting of a discharge is an in rem proceeding, and
the requirement of service of process does not change its essential
nature,6 nor does it effect an exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
state.'

While Hood represents a victory for the debtor, its scope is uncertain.
For example, the majority opinion is unclear as to the extent of the
bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction. After claiming that it covers all
estate property, "wherever located," 7 the majority later suggests that
a trustee's effort to recover estate property through a preference action
is not within the court's in rem jurisdiction. 8 Time will tell what, if
any, new issues Hood creates. But, one old issue remains in play: that

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 1910 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)).
Id. at 1913 n.5.
Id. at 1912.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1915 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
at 1917.

at
at
at
at

1913-14.
1914.
1910.
1914.
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is the constitutionality
of § 106(a),19 which purports to abrogate state
20
sovereign immunity.
T.
A.

PROCEDUPRE

Deadlines

In a unanimous opinion, the United States Supreme Court in Kontrick
v. Ryan 2' decided that the deadline provided by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 400422 for filing a complaint objecting to discharge is
not jurisdictional in nature. 23 Rather, it is merely a claim-processing
rule. 24 Thus, a debtor cannot challenge the timeliness of the complaint
after the adversary proceeding has been decided on the merits.25
In Kontrick one count in the creditor's complaint objecting to discharge
was filed after the filing deadline, but the debtor did not raise untimeliness of the complaint until after the bankruptcy court granted summary

19. 11 U.S.C. § 106(a).
20. The majority of courts in the Eleventh Circuit have held that § 106(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code is unconstitutional as applied to states. See, e.g., Skandalakis v. Geeslin,
303 B.R. 533, 538 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2004); Ala. Dep't of Human Res. v. Lewis, 279 B.R.
308, 319 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2002); Monseratt v. Student Loan Fin. Corp. (In re Monseratt),
289 B.R. 183, 187 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002); Venable v. Acosta (In re Venable), 280 B.R. 916,
918 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002); Levin v. New York (In re Levin), 284 B.R. 308, 311 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 2002); King v. Florida (In re King), 280 B.R. 767, 777 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2002);
Taylor v. Georgia (In re Taylor), 249 B.R. 571, 573-74 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000).
Georgia courts, in some cases, have held that states do not retain sovereign immunity
in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Georgia v. Burke (In re Burke), No. 92-11482, 1997 WL 33125720,
*3 (S.D. Ga. July 23, 1997) (state sovereign immunity was properly abrogated pursuant to
Congress's power to enforce privileges and immunities clause of the 14th Amendment),
affd on othergrounds, 146 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 1998); Frazier v. Georgia (In re Frazier),
No. 02-41136, Adv. Proc. No. 02-4133, slip op. at 12 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. June 12, 2003); Smith
v. Goode (In re Smith), 301 B.R. 96, 100 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2003) (states surrendered
immunity in bankruptcy by ratifying the Constitution), questioned by Geeslin, 303 B.R. at
538; Wilson v. S.C. State Educ. Assistance Auth. (In re Wilson), 258 B.R. 303, 306 (Bankr.
S.D. Ga. 2001) (state sovereign immunity was properly abrogated pursuant to Congress's
power to enforce privileges and immunities clause of the 14th Amendment).
21. 124 S. Ct. 906 (2004).
22. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004. Rule 4004(a) provides that "a complaint objecting to the
debtor's discharge under § 727(a) of the Code shall be filed no later than 60 days after the
first date set for the meeting of creditors." FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a). Pursuant to Rule
4004(b), the court can, for cause, grant an extension of time to file such a complaint only
if the request for extension is made prior to the expiration of the filing deadline. FED. R.
BANKR. P. 4004(b). According to Rule 9006(b)(3), an extension can be granted only in the
circumstances outlined above. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(3).
23. 124 S. Ct. at 914.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 918.
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judgment for the creditor.26 The debtor argued that, like subject matter
jurisdiction, untimeliness of a complaint objecting to discharge could be
raised "any time in the proceedings, even initially on appeal or
certiorari."27 The Court rejected this argument, distinguishing between
subject matter jurisdiction, which "cannot be expanded to account for the
parties' litigation conduct," and a claim-processing rule, which can "be
forfeited if the party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the
point."2" The Court held that the Rule 4004 deadline created an
affirmative defense. 29 "Ordinarily, under the Bankruptcy Rules as
under the Civil Rules, a defense is lost if it is not included in the answer
or amended answer ....
Only lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is
Thus, because the filing deadline was not
preserved post-trial.""
jurisdictional in nature, untimeliness of filing could not be raised after
a judgment on the merits.3
The Court specifically left open the question of whether equitable
doctrines, such as equitable tolling, may apply to the Rule 4004 deadline,
In other
but noted a split on the issue among the lower courts.
words, if the debtor does raise untimeliness of the complaint in his
answer, can the creditor rely on equity to save his complaint? A Georgia
bankruptcy court said yes, holding that the deadline to file a complaint
of a statute of
to determine dischargeability of a debt was in the nature
33
limitations and, thus, was subject to equitable tolling
B.

JudicialEstoppel

Judicial estoppel prevents a litigant from asserting a position that is
inconsistent with one he successfully asserted in a prior judicial
proceeding. Applying judicial estoppel in state courts based on a debtor's
action in bankruptcy courts was fertile ground for legal developments in
2003. The Supreme Court of Alabama weighed in and transformed its

26. Id. at 911-12.
27. Id. at 915.
28. Id. at 916.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 917-18.
31. Id. at 918.
32. Id. at 917 n.11.
33. In re Phillips, 288 B.R. 585, 593 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2002). Rule 4007 governs the
deadline for filing a complaint to determine dischargeability with language identical to that
used in Rule 4004(a)-(b). See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007. C.f In re Gilley, 288 B.R. 901, 90507 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) (court would not rely on equity to allow late proof of claim); Zich
v. Wheeler Wolf Attorneys (In re Zich), 291 B.R. 883, 885 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2003) (court
cannot use its general equity powers to extend deadline for filing proof of claim).
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test for judicial estoppel. In Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 4 plaintiff
sued the bank for allowing his wife to remove $500,000 from a safe
deposit box. The bank raised judicial estoppel as a defense because in
a prior bankruptcy proceeding, plaintiff had claimed that the money did
not exist.3 5 Under existing Alabama law, judicial estoppel required,
among other things, that "'the parties and questions [in both judicial
proceedings] be the same'" (privity) and that "'the party claiming
estoppel [was] misled and... changed his position.'" 3 1 In this case, the
bank lacked both privity and reliance; thus, judicial estoppel should have
been unavailable.37 However, the court decided to reconsider its test
because "[tihe conscience and feeling of justice of the overwhelming
majority whose obedience is required to a rule that would permit [the
debtor] to play fast and loose with the court would be, quite simply,
shocked."3" Because judicial estoppel "protects the integrity of the
judicial system, not the litigants," reliance and privity "should not be
essential elements of the doctrine of judicial estoppel." 9 Consequently,
the court adopted a new test for judicial estoppel, relying on the
standards set forth by the Supreme Court in New Hampshire v.

Maine :40
(1) "a party's later position must be 'clearly inconsistent' with its earlier
position;" (2) the party must have been successful in the prior
proceeding so that "judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a
later proceeding would create 'the perception that either the first or
second court was misled;'" and (3) the party seeking to assert an
inconsistent position must "derive an unfair advantage or impose an
unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped."41

34. Exparte First Ala. Bank, No. 1020855, 2003 WL 22113920 (Ala. Sept. 12, 2003).
35. Id. at *1-2.
36. Id. at *4 (quoting Jinright v. Paulk, 758 So. 2d 553, 555 (Ala. 2000)). The court
articulated the full test as follows:
"(1) The inconsistent position first asserted must have been successfully
maintained; (2) a judgment must have been rendered; (3) the positions must be
clearly inconsistent; (4) the parties and questions must be the same; (5) the party
claiming estoppel must have been misled and have changed his position; and (6)
it must appear unjust to one party to permit the other to change."
Id. (quoting Jinright, 758 So. 2d at 555).
37. Id. at *5.
38. Id. at *8.
39. Id. at *6 (citing Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.
2002)).
40. 532 U.S. 742 (2001).
41. Ex parte First Ala. Bank, 2003 WL 22113920, at *7 (quoting New Hampshire, 532
U.S. at 750-51) (internal citations omitted).
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The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals also added to its catalog of
42
bankruptcy-related judicial estoppel cases. Barger v. Cartersville
appears to deal a blow to debtors' efforts to avoid judicial estoppel by
adding a previously undisclosed cause of action to their bankruptcy
In Barger the debtor was pursuing an employment
schedules.4 3
discrimination claim for damages and reinstatement of employment
when she filed a no-asset Chapter 7 case. She did not list the claim on
her bankruptcy schedules. At the meeting of creditors, she told her
attorney and the trustee about the claim, but indicated to the trustee
that she was only seeking injunctive relief. During discovery in the
discrimination case, she failed to disclose her bankruptcy when asked
whether she was involved in any legal proceedings. The debtor was
ultimately granted a discharge, and her creditors received no distribution. The defendant in the discrimination case learned of the discharge
and raised judicial estoppel as a defense. In response, the debtor
reopened her bankruptcy case and added the employment discrimination
claim to her schedules. Nevertheless, her discrimination case was
44
dismissed based on judicial estoppel and she appealed that decision.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.45
Under the Eleventh Circuit's test for judicial estoppel, "a party's
allegedly inconsistent positions must have been 'made under oath in a
prior proceeding"' and "the 'inconsistencies must be shown to have been
calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system.'" 41 In this case,
the court focused on the debtor's intent to manipulate the system, which
can be inferred when "the debtor has knowledge of the undisclosed
claims and has motive for concealment." 47 It was undisputed that the
debtor knew of the claim. However, she argued that her disclosure of
the claim to her attorney and the trustee, and her attempt to amend her
schedules, weighed against a finding of intent to manipulate.4" The
court disagreed. 49
Any error by the debtor's bankruptcy attorney should not be charged
Rather, the
against the defendant in the nonbankruptcy case. °

42. 348 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003).
43. Id. at 1297. The issue of judicial estoppel typically is raised in bankruptcy courts
when debtors attempt to amend their schedules to add a previously omitted cause of action.
44. Id. at 1291-92.
45. Id. at 1297.
46. Id. at 1293-94 (quoting Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1284).
47. Id. at 1294 (citing Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1287).
48. Id. at 1294-95.
49. Id. at 1295.
50. Id.
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debtor's remedy is to sue her attorney for malpractice.5 1 In addition,
a debtor's omission can only be considered inadvertent if there is no
motive to conceal the claim.52 In this case, the nondisclosure allowed
the debtor to shield the proceeds of her cause of action from her
which unquestionably provided the debtor with a motive to
creditors,
53
conceal.

The debtor's disclosure to the trustee did not save her claim because
she told the trustee only about the claim for injunctive relief and failed
to tell the trustee about the claim for damages.54 This limited disclosure strengthened the inference that the debtor was engaged in
intentional manipulation of the system.5 5 Finally, the debtor's attempt
to amend her schedules only upon the threat of judicial estoppel further
weakened her position.5" As a result, the court barred the debtor's
employment discrimination claim for damages.5 But the debtor's claim
for reinstatement was allowed to go forward because it had no effect on
her bankruptcy estate."
A different panel of the court of appeals reached a different result in
Parker v. Wendy's International,Inc. 9 Parker also involved a Chapter
7 debtor who had a prepetition employment discrimination claim but did
not list that claim on her bankruptcy schedules. After the debtor
received a discharge, her attorney in the nonbankruptcy case alerted the
court to the debtor's omission and sought a continuance so the bankruptcy case could be reopened and the claim added as an asset. At that
time, the Chapter 7 trustee, who is charged with administering the
assets of the bankruptcy estate, intervened as a plaintiff in the
employment discrimination case. Later, the defendant successfully
raised judicial estoppel as a defense, and the case was dismissed.6" The
court of appeals reversed the dismissal.6 1
As in Barger,the court relied on a two-part inquiry: (1) the assertion
of inconsistent positions that (2) were intended to "'make a mockery of

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1296.

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1297.
57. Id. Compare In re Haskett, 297 B.R. 637, 644 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2003) (no bad
motive when debtor attempted to remedy nondisclosure before judicial estoppel was raised).
58. 348 F.3d at 1297.
59. No. 02-16185, 2004 WL 813174 (11th Cir. April 15, 2004).
60. Id. at *1-2.
61. Id. at *4.
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the judicial system."'6 2 But, where Barger focused on intent, Parker
focused on the assertion of inconsistent positions.63 Because the trustee
was the real party in interest and the trustee had not asserted any
inconsistent positions, judicial estoppel could not prevent the trustee
from pursuing the employment discrimination claim.64
This result appears to be in direct opposition to Barger. In Barger, the
trustee was substituted as the real party in interest. 65 Nevertheless,
the inconsistent positions taken by the debtor were sufficient to satisfy
the first prong of the judicial estoppel inquiry against the trustee.66
Interestingly, the court's initial opinion in Parker, which was subsequently vacated and replaced, held that the trustee was charged with
the debtor's inconsistent assertions.67 In its revised opinion, the court
in Parkerindicated that judicial estoppel could only be asserted against
the trustee if it would have been available as a defense against the
debtor in the absence of bankruptcy.68
III.
A.

CASE ADMINISTRATION

Attorney Compensation

Chapter 7 debtors' attorneys cannot be paid out of the bankruptcy
estate, according to the Supreme Court in Lamie v. United States
Trustee.69 The Court was asked to interpret § 330(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides for compensation for the services of certain
professionals. 7' The previous version of the statute expressly provided
for payment to the debtor's attorney.71 When the provision was
amended in 1994, the reference to the debtor's attorney was deleted in
what appears to be a "legislative drafting error," rather than the intent
of Congress, resulting in some grammatical peculiarities. 72 Conse-

62. Id. at *3 (quoting Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1285).
63. Id.
64. Id. at *4.
65. 348 F.3d at 1292-93.
66. Id. at 1294.
67. Parker v.Wendy's Int'l, No. 02-16185, slip op. at 1598 ( 1 1 th Cir. March 31, 2003 [sic])
(vacated by Parker,2004 WL 813174, at *1). Although the slip opinion is dated 2003, it
was actually entered on March 31, 2004. See Parker,2004 WL 813174, at *1.
68. Parker,2004 WL 813174, at *4 n.3.
69. 124 S.Ct. 1023, 1027 (2004).
70. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (2000).
71. 124 S. Ct. at 1027-28; 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (1988), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)
(2000).
72. 124 S. Ct. at 1028. Prior to the amendment, § 330(a) provided in relevant part:
"'[T]he court may award to a trustee, to an examiner, to a professional person employed

2004]

BANKRUPTCY

1109

quently, courts divided into two camps: those (including the Eleventh
Circuit) that adhered to the plain language of the statute to deny
payment to Chapter 7 debtors' attorneys from estate funds, and those
,:
".
I
I
.
. .
.
. _
_
- ..
J,.
1_ -,._
' . I.
+ _.,+ -- I., ,1
that r.i. ov. legislativ htL
t Uisei11
eoutgresbtuiai intent To aliow
payment of the attorneys.7 3
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court took the plain language
approach. 74 The Court began its analysis by intoning its mantra that
"'when the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts-at
least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd-is to
enforce it according to its terms.' 7 ' Although the statute's amendment
makes it ungrammatical and nonparallel, the Court stated that these
problems do not result in ambiguity.7 6 The statute clearly sets out the
type of people eligible for compensation and the type of compensation
available.77
In the absence of ambiguity, the Court cannot deviate from the plain
meaning unless doing so leads to an absurd result. 7 In this case, the
Court noted that debtors' attorneys have other paths available for
compensation, such as receiving payment prior to filing the petition or
obtaining approval for post-petition employment by the Chapter 7
trustee. 79 Furthermore, those circuits that follow the plain language
approach are apparently functioning smoothly.8 0
Consequently, no

under section 327 or 1103 of this title, or to the debtor's attorney-(1) reasonable
compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by such trustee, examiner,
professional person, or attorney. . . .'" Id. Section 330(a) now provides: "'[T]he court may
award to a trustee, an examiner, a professional person employed under section 327 or
1103--(A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by the trustee,
examiner, professional person, or attorney.'" Id.
The amendment left § 330(a)(1) "with a missing 'or' that infects its grammar .
Furthermore, the Act's inclusion of the word 'attorney' in § 330(a)(1)(A) defeats the neat
parallelism that otherwise marks the relationship between [current] §§ 330(a)(1) and
330(a)(1)(A)." Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1030.
75. Id. (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6
(2000)).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1031.
79. Id. at 1031-32.
80. Id. at 1032. The Court noted that even if it were to examine the legislative history,
that history "creates more confusion than clarity about the congressional intent." Id. at
1033.
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absurd result flows from the application of the plain language of the
statute, so the statute must be applied as written."1
B.

Dismissal

Does Chapter 7 have a good faith filing requirement? One court has
said no. 2 A creditor of a corporate Chapter 7 debtor sought to have the
case dismissed on the ground that it was filed in bad faith." Pursuant
to Section 707(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, a Chapter 7 case may be
dismissed "for cause." 4 The Code provides a list of circumstances that
constitute cause for dismissal.8 5 Although lack of good faith filing is
not among the circumstances listed, the list is not exclusive.8 6
In its analysis of "cause," the court turned to case law that developed
three lines of reasoning.8 7 First, some courts hold that debtors are not
required to file a Chapter 7 petition in good faith. 8 Second, other
courts allow dismissal for lack of good faith filing only when the
circumstances are egregious, such as in the case of "'concealed or
misrepresented assets and/or sources of income, and excessive and
continued expenditures, lavish life-style, and intention to avoid a large
single debt based on conduct akin to fraud, misconduct, or gross
negligence."'89 Finally, some courts refuse to characterize the problem
as lack of good faith, but instead consider whether "the debtor's motives
for filing the [Clhapter 7 petition are inconsistent with the established
purpose of the Bankruptcy Code."9" The court agreed with the first line
of cases, noting that "Chapter 7 makes no mention of a good faith
requirement" and that unlike debtors in Chapters 13 and 11, Chapter 7
debtors do not "continue in possession of their assets [or] alter their
contractual relationships with their creditors."9 As long as the debtor

81. Id. at 1034. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer concurred, but stated that when
"there is such a plausible basis for believing that a significant change in statutory law
resulted from a scrivener's error, [the Court has] a duty to examine legislative history."
Id. at 1035 (Stevens, J., concurring).
82. In re RIS Investment Group, Inc., 298 B.R. 848, 851 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2003).
83. Id. at 850-51.
84. 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2000).
85. Id.
86. 298 B.R. at 851.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting Indus. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Zick (In re Zick), 931 F.2d 1124, 1129 (6th
Cir. 1991)).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 851-52.
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is willing to give up the benefits
of Chapters 11 and 13, his motives in
92
filing Chapter 7 are irrelevant.
Despite its holding, the court acknowledged that certain
circunsAunces, not present in this case, could give rise to cause for
dismissal of a Chapter 7 corporate debtor, including "a severe threat to
public health, an abuse of the legal process, or some comparable
extraordinary circumstances.""
IV.

A.

DEBTOR PROTECTIONS

Automatic Stay

1. Violations. The manner in which a creditor allocates payments
does not, by itself, violate the automatic stay.94 In Smith v. Fairbanks
Capital Corp. (In re Smith), the debtor alleged that the creditor was
collecting attorney fees in violation of the automatic stay by allocating
the debtor's payments to attorney fees rather than to the debt.95 The
court held that so long as the creditor did not collect money in excess of
its allowed claim, which did not include an amount for attorney fees, it
could allocate the payments in any manner without violating the
automatic stay.96 Because the allocation was merely a product of the
creditor's internal recordkeeping and the creditor made no overt act 97
to
collect an amount in excess of the claim, there was no stay violation.
In Ford v. A.C. Loftin (In re Ford),9" the court found that a foreclosure sale of a residence in which the debtor had a beneficial interest
violated the automatic stay.99 The creditor raised § 549(c) as a defense
that provides that a post-petition transfer of real estate to a good faith
purchaser who was without knowledge of the bankruptcy cannot be
avoided by the trustee.'00
The court recognized a split of authority on the issue of "whether
§ 549(c) applies to protect a purchaser at a postpetition foreclosure or tax
sale conducted in violation of the automatic stay."'' The court noted

92.
93.

Id. at 852.
Id. at 854.

94. Smith v. Fairbanks Capital Corp. (In re Smith), 299 B.R. 687,693 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
2003).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.

98. 296 B.R. 537 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2003).
99. Id. at 543.
100. Id. at 544 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 549(c) (2000)).
101. Id.
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that courts that allowed the defense to apply to a stay violation
generally did so without analysis. 1 2 Exceptions to the stay are listed
in § 362, and § 549(c) is not among them.0 3 Furthermore, the text of
§ 549(c) indicates that it may only be used as a defense to an avoidance
action initiated pursuant to § 549(a). 114 Thus, the court concluded that
there is no basis for allowing § 549(c) to be used as a defense to a stay
violation.'
2. Liability of Third Parties. The assignor of a claim is not liable
for the assignee's stay violation, according to the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals in Commodore Holdings, Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.10 6 After
the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the initial creditor, Esso Nederland B.V.,
assigned its claim to Pied Rich B.V. for consideration. Pied Rich then
violated the stay by placing a lien on certain property of the bankruptcy
estate. The debtor sought sanctions against Esso and other creditors
due to Pied Rich's stay violation. °7 The bankruptcy court refused to
sanction Esso, and the circuit court affirmed, stating that "[tihe fact of
the assignment, made for consideration, is not in itself an unlawful
collection practice or an act encouraging or assisting Pied Rich in
engaging in an unlawful practice."0 8
3. Sanctions. In two cases, courts indicated a willingness to award
various sanctions for stay violations even though the debtors suffered no
compensable financial damages.
For example, in Bishop v. U.S.
Bank /FirstarBank, N.A. (In re Bishop),'" the court held that § 362(h)
authorizes damages for emotional distress even in the absence of
financial damages."'
The court stated, "[an award of damages for
emotional distress due to a violation of the stay is appropriate where a
natural and powerful emotional distress is readily apparent from the
nature or extent of the wrongful conduct under the particular circumstances surrounding the stay violation.""' Because § 362(h) provides

102.
103.
104.
105.
defense,
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id. at 546.
Id.
Id. at 550. The court also explained that even if § 549(c) were an applicable
the creditor failed to satisfy the proof requirements. Id. at 556.
331 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1258-59.
Id. at 1259.
296 B.R. 890 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003).
Id. at 897; 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (2000).
296 B.R. at 895.
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for "'actual damages""" and emotional distress damages are actual
damages, "there appears to be no reason to question their statutory
authorization."
In reaching its decision, the court disagreed with a
Seventh Circuilt CourL 0 f Appeals case thlat 'equ'-es tilfe debU to 1-lav
some monetary loss on which to "piggyback" the emotional distress
damages." 4
Similarly, in In re Hedetneimi,"5 the court held that even though the
debtor had not suffered any damages compensable under § 362(h), he
could still be awarded attorney fees under that section." 6 Hence, the
court rejected the creditor's argument that attorney fees "are awarded
only to embellish actual damages. " "'
B.

Discrimination

A debtor's offer-in-compromise to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
to settle a tax debt "is not a 'license, permit, charter, franchise, or other
similar grant"' within the meaning of § 525(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code, 8 according to the court in Holmes v. United States (In re
Holmes)." 9 Section 525(a) prohibits a governmental unit from denying
such grants solely because a person is a debtor in bankruptcy. 120 The
debtor's tax liability in this case exceeded $9 million. After filing for
bankruptcy, he submitted an offer-in-compromise for the taxes owed.
The IRS had a written policy not to consider such offers from 2a
bankruptcy debtor until his case was either discharged or dismissed.' '
The court rejected the debtor's argument that the policy constituted
improper discrimination pursuant to § 525(a). 2 2 According to the
court, an offer-in-compromise does not fit within the ordinary meaning
of "license," and if Congress wanted to target a broader range of

112.

11 U.S.C. § 362(h).

113. 296 B.R. at 897.
114. Id. (citing Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 239 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2001)). In
Bishop the debtor did have a monetary loss, so he would have been entitled to emotional
distress damages even under the Seventh Circuit rule. Id.
115. 297 B.R. 837 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003).
116. Id. at 842.
117. Id. This case also considered the question of emotional distress damages, but the
court declined to award any such damages because of insufficient evidence to establish
emotional distress. Id.
118. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2000).
119. 298 B.R. 477, 483 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2003).
120. Id. at 480 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (Supp. 2003)).
121. Id. at 479-80 (citing INTERNAL REvENUE MANUAL §§ 5.8.3.2.1(1)(b) & 5.17.4.7
(1998)).

122. Id. at 483.
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discrimination, it could have done so. 123 But the court relied on its

§ 105(a) 124 power to order the IRS to consider the debtor's offer-incompromise.' 2 5 The IRS's internal policy "does not have the force and
effect of law," and it "frustrates the basic principles of the Bankruptcy
Code" and
the Tax Code. 2 Thus, the IRS was obligated to consider
127
offer.
the
V. BANKRUPTCY ESTATE
A.

Property of the Estate

1. Use of Estate Property. In McGlockling v. Chrysler Financial
Co., LLC (In re McGlockling),28 the court considered whether a
Chapter 13 debtor's car remained property of the bankruptcy estate after
plan confirmation.'2 9 The debtor, who served in the United States
Army, was transferred to Germany. Relying on its sales contract,
Chrysler refused to allow the debtor to take the car out of the country.3 ' However, if the car were estate property, then the debtor would
be entitled to use it pursuant to §§ 363(b) and 1303.131
In the Eleventh Circuit, only that property necessary to carry out the
Chapter 13 plan remains in the bankruptcy estate after confirmation. 3 2 The court determined that the appropriate test for necessary
property "is to examine the individual debtor to determine what is
necessary, under the particular facts and circumstances, to complete a
successful plan.", 31 In this case, reliable transportation was necessary
to the successful completion of the debtor's plan.3 4 As a result, the car
was property of the estate that the debtor was entitled to use, even if it
meant taking the car to Germany.'3 '

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 482-83.
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000).
298 B.R. at 486 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)).
Id.
Id.
296 B.R. 884 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003).
Id. at 887.
Id. at 886-87.
Id. at 887 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2000) and 11 U.S.C. § 1303 (2000)).
Id. (citing Telfair v. First Union Mortgage Corp., 216 F.3d 1333, 1340 (11th Cir.

2000)).
133.
134.
135.
insured

Id.
Id. at 888.
Id. The court noted that Chrysler was adequately protected because the car was
and the debtor had stable employment. Id. at 889.
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2. Distribution of Estate Property. Deciding an issue of first
impression in the Eleventh Circuit, a Florida bankruptcy court held that

-hen a Chapter 7 trustee

hol-ds es-tate

propertyfor

c

ion

to

creditors, she may be subject to garnishment by a creditor's creditor." 6
The court rejected the reasoning of the sole case on point decided under
the current Bankruptcy Code, which prohibited such garnishment of the
trustee on the grounds that it impedes administration of the estate and
that the proper procedure is to seek substitution under Bankruptcy Rule
3001(e)(2). 137 The court stated that "where the claims against the
estate creditor have been reduced to final judgment and a garnishment
judgment has been issued prior to bankruptcy distribution, the sole
burden on the trustee is the substitution of one creditor's name and
address for that of another."'
Thus, the burden on the trustee is
slight and is certainly no greater than the burden imposed by substitution under Rule 3001(e). 139 Furthermore, the purpose of that rule is
to establish the authenticity of the transfer of a claim. 4 ° In other
words, it is merely a safeguard.'' In the case of a garnishment, that
purpose has been served by the court issuing the garnishment.'
Thus, there is no reason143to prohibit garnishment, particularly when the
trustee does not object.
B.

Thrnover

The issue of whether a debtor may obtain turnover of a vehicle that
was repossessed prepetition continues to work its way through the courts
in Georgia. 1'
In 2002 a bankruptcy court held that the debtor is
entitled to turnover so long as the repossessed vehicle has not been
resold. 4 ' The district court affirmed.'
The case is pending before

136. In re Brickell, 292 B.R. 705, 709 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2003).
137. Id. at 708-09 (citing NVLand, Inc. v. Vogel (In re Ocean Downs Racing Ass'n), 164
B.R. 249, 254-55 (Bankr. D. Md. 1993)).
138. Id. at 709.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Under the laws of both Florida and Alabama, a debtor does not retain sufficient
ownership interest in a vehicle repossessed prepetition to seek turnover. Bell-Tel Fed.
Credit Union v. Kalter (In re Kalter), 292 F.3d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 2002); Lewis v.
Charles R. Hall Motors, Inc. (In re Lewis), 137 F.3d 1280, 1285 (11th Cir. 1998).
145. Rozier v. Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Rozier), 283 B.R. 810, 813 (Bankr. M.D.
Ga. 2002).
146. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Rozier, 290 B.R. 910, 913 (M.D. Ga. 2003).
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the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which certified the following
question to the Supreme Court of Georgia:
Does legal title, or any other ownership interest that would give a right
of possession, pass to that creditor under Georgia law upon repossession of an automobile subsequent to a debtor's default on an automobile
installment loan contract, or does such legal title or other ownership
interest remain in the debtor?' 47
The Eleventh Circuit already ruled that under Alabama and Florida
laws, a debtor retains only a right of redemption in a repossessed
vehicle, which is not sufficient to bring the vehicle into the bankruptcy
estate. 14 Nevertheless, Florida debtors attempted to compel turnover
of their repossessed car by proposing to redeem it through their Chapter
13 plan. 149 First, the court determined that redemption requires a
lump sum payment of all obligations owed. 5 ° Neither an intention to
propose a plan nor an actual filed plan that pays the full redemption
amount over time fulfills the lump sum requirement."' Second, the
court relied on a circuit court case to determine that a "debtor [may] not52
modify [a] statutory right of redemption under a Chapter 13 plan."
As a result, the debtors' effort to obtain turnover failed."'

C. Exemptions
The post-petition appreciation of exempt property benefits the debtor,

not the bankruptcy estate.1 4 The debtor in Tidwell v. Leskosky (In re
Leskosky) 55s sought to exempt certain stock under Georgia's wildcard
exemption. 6 The debtor valued the stock at ten dollars. The trustee
argued that any increase in the value of the stock should accrue to the
benefit of the estate.'5 7 The court disagreed."
The Bankruptcy

147. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Rozier (In re Rozier), 348 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir.
2003) (emphasis omitted).
148. Kalter, 292 F.3d at 1356; Lewis, 137 F.3d at 1284.
149. In re Menasche, 301 B.R. 757, 758 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2003).
150. Id. at 762.
151. Id.
152. Id. (citing Commercial Fed. Mortgage Corp. v. Smith (In re Smith), 85 F.3d 1555,
1560 (11th Cir. 1996)). In Smith the court of appeals held that the right of redemption
could not be modified through a Chapter 13 plan after a foreclosure sale had terminated
the debtor's interest in real property. 85 F.3d at 1559.
153. 301 B.R. at 763.
154. Tidwell v. Leskosky (In re Leskosky), 287 B.R. 295, 296 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2002).
155. 287 B.R. 295 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2002).
156. O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(6) (2002).
157. 287 B.R. at 296.
158. Id.
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Code requires the value of an exemption to be determined on the date
of filing. 5 ' Although this may ultimately lead to a windfall for the
debtor, the "'alternative would be to keep the bankruptcy proceeding
•A
°
11
Luunaul tlluduy, Lbil
open indefinitely; Lhe ulbjectiuis are
court explained that a local rule stating that "[e]xemptions will be
limited to the dollar amount claimed as exempt even if the asset
exempted is later discovered to have had a greater value than the
amount listed in the schedules" merely sets the value of the exemption
on the date of filing unless an objection is raised.' 8 ' The court's
decision is consistent with the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Allen v.
Green (In re Green),'6' in which the court stated, "an unstated premise
of the [United States Supreme] Court's holding [in Taylor v.Freeland&
Kronz] was that a debtor who exempts the entire reported value of an
asset is claiming the 'full amount,' whatever it turns out to be."'
.1 .

VI.

CLAIMS

If a debtor owns collateral for a debt but is not personally liable on the
debt, the debtor may pay it through a Chapter 13 plan.'6 In In re
Curinton,"6 a corporation borrowed money from the creditor to
purchase real estate. 166 The corporation later transferred title in the
property to the debtor, and then the corporation was administratively
dissolved. The debtor never became obligated on the mortgage. The
creditor accepted payments from the debtor for three years and allowed
the debtor to cure a default. After a subsequent default, the creditor
initiated foreclosure proceedings. The proceedings were halted when the
debtor filed for bankruptcy and proposed to pay the creditor's claim
through a Chapter 13 plan. The creditor argued that because no privity

Id. at 297 (citing Polis v. Getaways, Inc. (In re Polis), 217 F.3d 899, 902 (7th Cir.

159.

2000)).
160. Id. (quoting Polis, 217 F.3d at 903).
161. Id. (citing LBR 4003-1(a)(3)).
162. 31 F.3d 1098 (11th Cir. 1994).
163. Id. at 1100 (citing Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 641-44 (1992)). In
Green the debtor scheduled a lawsuit as an asset valued at one dollar and claimed the
lawsuit as exempt, valuing the exemption at one dollar. Id. at 1098. When she settled the
lawsuit for $15,000, the court found the proceeds to be fully exempt. Id. at 1099. See also
In re Ferretti, 203 B.R. 796, 799 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996) (because claimed value of lawsuit
and claimed value of exemption were the same, one dollar, and trustee had not timely
objected to that valuation, debtor was entitled to all proceeds when lawsuit settled for

$70,000).
164.
165.
166.

In re Curington, 300 B.R. 78, 84 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003).
300 B.R. 78 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003).
Id. at 84.
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of contract existed between it and the debtor, the creditor had no claim
87
The court disagreed. 168
that could be paid through the plan.'
While noting a split of authority, the court relied on the United States
Supreme Court case of Johnson v. Home State Bank169 to conclude that

"a claim against the debtor need not be against the debtor personally (in
personam), but could consist solely of a claim against the debtor's
property (in rem).""70 Thus, the creditor had a claim that the debtor
could pay through a Chapter 13 plan.' 7'
United States v.Galletti"7 ' raised the issue of whether the Internal
Revenue Service could assert a claim for taxes in the debtors' bankruptcy cases. Under tax law, the IRS has ten years to collect taxes that have
been timely assessed. In this case, the IRS timely assessed taxes
against the partnership but not against the general partners, the
debtors. After the general partners filed bankruptcy, the IRS filed
claims in their cases. The debtors objected to the claims on the ground
that the IRS never assessed taxes against them as general partners. The
bankruptcy court sustained the objection, and was affirmed by the
district and circuit courts.'7 3 The Supreme Court reversed and
remanded.' 74 The Court's decision turned on an interpretation of the
Internal Revenue Code that a tax, not a taxpayer, is assessed.'75 Once
the tax has been timely assessed, the IRS has ten years to collect from
anyone who is liable, including the debtors.'76
VII. AVOIDANCE
Payments for services provided in furtherance of a Ponzi scheme are
not per se avoidable as fraudulent transfers, according to Orlick v.
Kozyak (In re FinancialFederated Title & Trust, Inc.).177 Defendant
provided certain administrative and managerial assistance to the debtor,
a company engaged in a Ponzi scheme for eighteen months, and was
compensated by more than $1 million. The bankruptcy trustee sought
to avoid payment of the full amount of the compensation as a fraudulent

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 79-80.
Id. at 84.
501 U.S. 78 (1991).
300 B.R. at 80-81 (citing Johnson, 501 U.S. at 85).
Id. at 85.
124 S. Ct. 1548 (2004).
Id. at 1551.
Id. at 1555.
Id. at 1554.
Id.
309 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 2002).

BANKRUPTCY

20041

1119

transfer pursuant to § 548.178 Both the bankruptcy and district courts
held, as a matter of law, that defendant could not raise a "for value and
in good faith" dI
defense because
she "assisted
perpetuating
[a .Ponzi]
....
I
- --. in
....
1-I-_. 1 _179
.. ...
scheme, [and! t erre
'0n1 o v11
lue Wab 0r coulu U legally givein.
The court of appeals reversed.'
The case relied upon by the lower
courts ignored the question of culpability; in other words, it did not
8
consider whether defendant intended to further an illegal scheme.1 '
By removing the culpability issue, any party, including landlords,
utilities, etc., whose services were used in the course of a Ponzi scheme,
would be deprived of the "for value and in good faith" defense to a
fraudulent transfer suit.'8 2 The court concluded that defendant should

have an opportunity at trial to prove that, despite the fact that her
services were used in furtherance of a Ponzi scheme,
the debtor received
18 3
value for her services and she acted in good faith.
In another fraudulent transfer case, Jensen v. Captiva Limousine
Service, Inc. (In re Rajkovic),8 4 the court considered the implications
when the transferred funds, prior to the transfer, were of a type that
could be exempted in a bankruptcy case.8 5 In Jensen the debtor
received $100,000 from a worker's compensation claim.' 8 He transferred nearly $66,000 of that money to his corporation before filing for
bankruptcy. The trustee sought to recover the money on the ground that
it was a fraudulent transfer. The debtor argued that because worker's
compensation is exempt under Florida law, the transfer
could not be
88
avoided.

7

The court ruled in favor of the trustee.

The court first noted that the transfer of "exempt homestead property
could not be set aside as fraudulent."'89 But unlike the homestead
exemption, which is granted by the state constitution, the worker's
compensation exemption is granted by statute and, therefore, can be

178. Id. at 1327-28; 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2000).
179. 309 F.3d at 1331 (quoting Martino v. Edison Worldwide Capital (In re Randy), 189
B.R. 425, 442 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995)).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1332 (citing Merrill v. Allen (In re Universal Clearing House Co.), 60 B.R.
985, 999 (D. Utah 1986)).
183. Id. at 1332-33.
184. 289 B.R. 197 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002).
185. Id. at 198.
186. Id. at 199.
187. Id. at 199-200.
188. Id. at 201.
189. Id. at 200-01 (citing Kapila v. Fornabaio (In re Fornabaio), 187 B.R. 780, 782
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995)) (emphasis added).
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distinguished.' 90 Furthermore, the purpose of worker's compensation
191
"is rehabilitation of the man and not the payment of his debts."
Once the funds in this case were transferred to the corporation, they
could no longer be used for their intended purpose. 9 2 The court
refused to allow the exemption as a defense to the fraudulent transfer
because to allow the corporation "to immunize the monies it received
would be a perversion of the very purpose of the Statute designed to
assist an injured worker to achieve rehabilitation." 93
In Yates v. Hendon,' the Supreme Court decided an ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974) issue. However, the
issue was raised in a bankruptcy case, and is thus, worth mentioning.
The debtor had set up and was the trustee for a profit-sharing plan for
a corporation that he wholly owned. The debtor took a loan from the
plan, but failed to make payments according to the terms of the loan.
Nevertheless, he eventually repaid the outstanding principal and
interest with two payments. Three weeks after the payments, he
became the subject of an involuntary bankruptcy petition, and the
trustee sought to recover the payments as preferential transfers. 9' At
issue was "whether a working owner may qualify as a participant in an
employee benefit plan covered by ERISA."' 9' The Court answered in
the affirmative, relying on congressional intent as revealed by "multiple
indications" in the text of ERISA, and remanded the case for consideration of the avoidance issue.'9 7
VIII.

LEASES AND EXECUTORY CONTRACTS

A debtor must cure both monetary and nonmonetary defaults to
assume an executory contract, according to the court in In re Williams.'91 The debtor leased a truck from his employer. According to
the terms of the lease, the truck could not be used for any other
company's work. Nevertheless, the debtor changed jobs and continued
using the truck. He later filed a Chapter 13 petition and sought to
assume the lease. The debtor was able to cure a monetary default, but
he argued that he did not need to cure the nonmonetary default that

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 201.
Id. (citing Surace v. Danna, 161 N.E. 315, 315-16 (N.Y. 1928)).
Id.
Id.
Yates v. Hendon, 124 S. Ct. 1330 (2004).
Id. at 1336-38.
Id. at 1338.
Id. at 1339, 1345.
299 B.R. 684, 686 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003).
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resulted from his use of the truck in the course of his employment with
a company other than the lessee.199
Generally, a debtor must cure defaults to assume a lease.200 However, § 365(b)(2) sets out certain exceptions to the cure requirement,
including "'the satisfaction of any penalty rate or provision relating to
a default arising from any failure by the debtor to perform nonmonetary
The court rejected
obligations under the executory contract ....,,,'o'
the argument that his subsection "articulat[es] two distinct exceptions
to the cure requirement: (1) penalty rate obligations and (2) nonmonetary obligations." 0 2 Instead, the court adopted the view that the
provision merely excludes certain penalties: penalty rates and penalty
provisions relating to nonmonetary defaults. 0 3 The nonmonetary
default itself is not excluded from the cure requirement.0 4 Because
the debtor's nonmonetary default was an incurable historical fact, he
could not assume the lease.20 5
IX.
A.

CONSUMER ISSUES

Discharge

1. Willful and Malicious Injury-§ 523(a)(6). NBA Properties,
Inc. v. Moir (In re Moir)16 raised the issue of whether a judgment for
conversion has a collateral estoppel effect on a nondischargeability action
for willful and malicious injury. 0 7 In the pre-petition conversion case,
a nonbankruptcy court awarded plaintiff compensatory damages,
attorney fees, and punitive damages against the debtor.20 8 In considering the first element of collateral estoppel, similarity of the issues20 9

199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 684-85.
Id. at 685 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) (2000)).
Id. at 686 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(2)(D) (2000)).
Id. (citing In re GP Express Airlines, Inc., 200 B.R. 222, 233-34 (Bankr. D. Neb.

1996)).
203. Id. at 686-87 (citing Worthington v. Gen. Motors Corp. (In re Claremont
Acquisition Corp.), 113 F.3d 1029, 1034 (9th Cir. 1997)).
204. Id. at 686.
205. Id. at 687. The First Circuit Court of Appeals recently rejected this approach,
holding that debtors need not cure nonmonetary defaults. Eagle Ins. Co. v. Bankvest
Capital Corp. (In re Bankvest Capital Corp.), 360 F.3d 291, 301 (1st Cir. 2004).
206. 291 B.R. 887 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003).
207. Id. at 891.
208. Id. at 890.
209. Collateral estoppel for bankruptcy purposes requires the following four elements:
(a) the issue in the prior action and the issue in the bankruptcy court are
identical, (b) the bankruptcy issue was actually litigated in the prior action, (c) the
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the court determined that conversion is a type of wrongful conduct
within the scope of the definition of "malicious."21" But a conversion
is not always willful; rather it "can arise from reckless or negligent
acts."21' In this case, the bankruptcy court relied on the award of
punitive damages to determine that the nonbankruptcy court had found
the requisite intent for willfulness and, thus, that the issues were
sufficiently identical to satisfy the first element of collateral estoppel 2 Finding that all the other elements of collateral estoppel were
satisfied, the court held that the debt was nondischargeable.2 13
2. Student Loans-§ 523(a)(8). The Eleventh Circuit formally
'
for analyzing the dischargeability of
adopted the Brunner test 14
student loans, but it avoided the question of partial discharges in Hemar
Insurance Corp. of America v. Cox (In re Cox).2" 5 The debtor had
earned several degrees, including two law degrees, and was licensed to
practice in two states. Nevertheless, his law practice was unprofitable,
so he began working for a landscaping company. Eventually he filed for
bankruptcy and sought to discharge more than $114,000 in student
loans. The bankruptcy court found that the debtor failed to prove undue
hardship, but due to the size of the loans, the court ordered a partial
discharge and left the debtor liable for only $50,000.216
The circuit court began its analysis by joining the Second, Third,
Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit Courts in adopting the Brunnertest
for determining whether a debtor satisfies the "undue hardship"
requirement for discharging student loans. 21' Thus, in this circuit, the
debtor must now prove the following:
"(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and
expenses, a 'minimal' standard of living for herself and her dependents
if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional circumstances exist

determination of the issue in the prior action was a critical and necessary part of
the judgment in that litigation, and (d) the burden of persuasion in the discharge
proceeding must not be significantly heavier than the burden of persuasion in the
initial action.
Id. at 891 (citing Bush v. Balfour Beatty Bahamas, Ltd. (In re Bush), 62 F.3d 1319, 1322
(11th Cir. 1995)).

210. Id. at 892.
211. Id. (citing Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1998)).
212. Id.

213. Id. at 892-94.
214. See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).
215. 338 F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2003).

216. Id. at 1240-41.
217. Id. at 1241.
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indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant
the
portion of the repayment period of the student loans; and
21 (3) that
debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans." 1
In the absence of a finding of undue hardship, the court held that no
discharge of student loans, partial or otherwise, may be ordered.21
The court noted that a string of amendments that made student loan
discharges successively harder to obtain is evidence of Congress's intent
to leave "'undue hardship' as the only possible avenue for a debtor to
obtain a discharge of student loan indebtedness."2 2 °
The court was silent as to whether partial discharges would be
permissible in conjunction with a finding of undue hardship. 221 This
silence leaves the creditors' attorneys free to argue for some continuing
liability. However, they may face some difficulty with that argument in
the Middle District of Georgia because the debtor may cite to the district
22 2
court decision in Educational Credit Management Corp. v. Carter,
223
which recently rejected the possibility of partial discharge in dicta.
B.

Chapter 13 Plans

1. Claims Modification. A debtor cannot alter an allowed secured
claim via her Chapter 13 plan.224 In Universal American Mortgage Co.
v. Bateman (In re Bateman),225 the debtor's mortgage company filed a
proof of claim evidencing a secured arrearage debt of $49,178.80.26
The debtor did not object, and the claim was allowed. The debtor's
Chapter 13 plan proposed to pay Universal $21,600 and listed that
amount as disputed. Universal did not object to confirmation of the
plan. More than a year after confirmation, when the trustee noticed and
alerted the debtor to the discrepancy between Universal's proof of claim
and the plan, the debtor objected to the proof of claim. In response,
Universal filed a motion to dismiss the debtor's case because her plan

218. Id. (quoting Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396).
219. Id. at 1241-42.
220. Id. at 1242-43.
221. Id.
222. 279 B.R. 872 (M.D. Ga. 2002).
223. Id. at 877.
224. Universal Am. Mortgage Co. v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 331 F.3d 821, 822 (1lth
Cir. 2003). A claim secured by a first mortgage in a residence cannot be modified in
Chapter 13. Id. at 826 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2000)). However, a debtor can cure
an arrearage in such a mortgage without violating § 1322(b)(2). Id. at 826 n.5 (citing 11
U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (2000)).
225. 331 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 2003).
226. Id. at 823.
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failed to comply with the
confirmation requirement that secured claims
227
be provided for in full.
The bankruptcy court sided with the debtor, sustaining her objection
and holding that plan confirmation was res judicata as to the amount of
Universal's claim. While its lien survived bankruptcy, it could not
pursue its arrearage claim beyond the $21,600 listed in the plan.
Furthermore, the court denied Universal's motion to dismiss; because
Universal had not objected to the plan, it could not now collaterally
attack the plan.228 The district court affirmed.229
First, with respect to the amount of Universal's claim, the circuit court
reversed the lower courts.230 Because the debtor had raised no objection to Universal's proof of claim, it was deemed allowed. 31 With an
appropriate procedure for objecting to claims spelled out in the
Bankruptcy Code and Rules, the court
refuse[d] to permit an inconsistent plan provision to constitute a
constructive objection by reason of the Plan's notation of dispute alone,
especially where a bankruptcy court does not consider an objection
until over a year after the Plan's confirmation .... That the Plan
states an amount in conflict with the proof of claim demands a
resolution of the inconsistency, but a debtor's post-confirmation
23 2
objection is not the appropriate vehicle by which to do so.
Thus, in addition to survival of the lien, the debtor would remain liable
for any amount of the claim not paid under the plan.233 Furthermore,
Universal's rights would be controlled by the mortgage and not any
contradictory plan provisions. 2
Second, the court refused to grant Universal's motion to dismiss
because it was not raised until three years into the plan.23 5 Universal
failed to protect its rights in the early stages of the Chapter 13 process
and had to bear "some responsibility for letting the discrepancy go this
far unchallenged." 23' At such a late point in the proceedings, the

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

822-23.
823-24.
824.
829.
827-28 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2000); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(f)).
828.
831.
834.
833-34.
833.
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prejudicial
effect of dismissal on the debtor and other creditors would be
237
severe.
238
bankruptcy courts in the Eleventh Circuit, the court in In re Thomas
held that a trustee need not show an extraordinary change in circumstances to modify a Chapter 13 plan.239 The court relied on the plain
language of § 1329, which provides that the trustee may request
modification of the plan at any time between confirmation and completion for one of three reasons, including to increase the amount of
payments.24 °
The debtor's bankruptcy schedules indicated that she had only $4000
equity in her home, which she claimed as exempt. However, when her
home was destroyed by fire, more than $25,000 in insurance proceeds
remained after the mortgage was satisfied. The trustee sought to modify
the plan to apply those excess proceeds to the claims of unsecured
creditors. 241 The court noted a split of authority, with one line of cases
requiring a showing of substantial or unanticipated change in circumstances to modify a plan, and a second line of cases imposing no such
requirement.2 42 The court determined that it was obligated to follow
the plain language of the statute.24 3 It could "not engraft the 'substantial' or 'unanticipated' conditions over the plain language of the Code"
because the plain language did not lead to an absurd result. 244 On the
contrary, the Code generally does not permit a debtor to receive and
keep a payment of $25,000 to the detriment of her creditors.245 Thus,
the court allowed modification so the proceeds could be distributed to
creditors.246
Some tension exists between this case and In re Leskosky,247 which
held that appreciation of exempt property accrues to the benefit of
debtors.24" Relying on Leskosky, a debtor could argue that the value

237. Id.
238. 291 B.R. 189 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2003).
239. Id. at 193.
240. Id. at 192 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1) (2000)).
241. Id. at 191-92.
242. Id. at 192-93.
243. Id. at 193-94.
244. Id. at 194.
245. Id. at 194, 196-97. The court also rejected the debtor's argument that res judicata
precluded modification. Id. at 197-98.
246. Id. at 198.
247. 287 B.R. 295 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2002).
248. Id. at 298.
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of her exempt property had merely appreciated since the date she filed
for bankruptcy and that she should retain the benefit of that appreciation. However, that argument might be difficult to make when the
property was never fully exempt. A better argument might be to allocate
the appreciation between the nonexempt portion of the residence and the
exempt portion.
3. Crame Down Rate. To confirm a Chapter 13 plan over a secured
creditor's objection, the debtor must either surrender the creditor's
collateral or propose to "cram down" the creditor's secured claim.249
Cram down requires that the creditor retain its lien and receive plan
payments equivalent to the present value of its claim. 2 0 Generally,
debtors satisfy the cram down requirements by proposing plan payments
Courts are
that total the amount of the secured claim plus interest.2
split over how to determine the appropriate interest rate.252 The
253
Supreme Court's recent plurality decision in Till v. SCS Credit Corp.
offers no resolution.
Justice Stevens, joined by three colleagues, authored the plurality
opinion, which announced the judgment of the Court. 2' He advocated
a "prime plus" or "formula" method, which relies on the prime rate plus
a risk factor based on the possibility of default. The bankruptcy court
accepted this approach when it was used by the debtors to propose a 9.5
percent rate on a claim secured by their truck, despite the fact that the
contract rate on the truck loan had been 21 percent.255
Under the formula approach, the bankruptcy court would begin with
the prime rate and adjust it upward according to risk of default.256

249. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).
250. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(B).
251. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 124 S. Ct. 1951, 1955-56 (2004) (plurality opinion).
252. Id. at 1956. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has not addressed this
question.
253. 124 S. Ct. 1951 (2004) (plurality opinion).
254. Id. at 1955 (Stevens, J.).
255. Id. at 1956-57. The district court reversed, endorsing a "coerced loan" approach,
in which the rate is determined by the rate "the creditor could have obtained if it had
foreclosed on the loan, sold the collateral, and reinvested the proceeds in loans of
equivalent duration and risk." Id. at 1957. The majority in the court of appeals took a
presumptive contract rate approach, in which the contract rate is deemed the appropriate
rate unless challenged by one of the parties. Id. at 1957-58. The dissent in the court of
appeals urged the formula approach or a "cost of funds" approach, which is based on "'what
it would cost the creditor to obtain the cash equivalent of the collateral from an alternative
source.'" Id. at 1958 (quoting In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 595-96 (7th Cir. 2002) (Rovner, J.,
dissenting).
256. Id. at 1961.
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The court would determine the risk enhancement-which generally has
been in the range of 1 to 3 percent-by considering relevant factors, such
as "the circumstances of the estate, the nature of the
security, and the
25 7
duration and feasibility of the reorganization plan."
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas endorsed a "risk-free"
rate.25 He agreed that some interest may be necessary, but that rate
should be dictated by the time value of money and not any risk factors
related to the debtor.5 9 Thomas argued that by considering risk
factors, the Court is actually valuing the debtor's promise to pay rather
than valuing "the property to be distributed" as required by the
statute.260
Justice Thomas never explains how the appropriate rate should be
determined, although he states that "[t]he prime rate is '[t]he interest
rate most closely approximating the riskless or pure rate for money."'2'" He concurred in judgment with the plurality because the 9.5
percent rate proposed by the debtor "is higher than the risk-free
262
rate."
Thus, it is sufficient to satisfy § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).263
Justice Scalia was joined by three colleagues in dissenting. 2 ' He
preferred the "presumed contract rate" approach, in which the contract
rate is the presumptive rate, but could be altered as necessary upon
motion of a party.265 This approach prevents the creditor from being
undercompensated "for the true risks of default."26 6 And it relies on
the assumptions that "the contract rate reasonably reflects actual risk
at the time of borrowing" and that "this risk persists when the debtor
files for Chapter 13.,"267 Furthermore, the contract rate approach is
more efficient than the prime plus formula, because the risk need not be
calculated by the court unless disputed2 by one of the parties; it has
already been determined by the market. 6

257. Id. at 1961-62.

258. 124 S. Ct. at 1965 (Thomas, J., concurring).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1966 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)).
261. Id. n.2 (quoting ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING & FINANCE 830 (9th ed. 1991)). But
see 124 S.Ct. at 172 n.6 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (indicating that the treasury rate, which
is two percent lower than the prime rate, is a risk-free rate).
262. Id. at 1968.
263. Id.
264. 124 S.Ct. at 1968 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1970.

268. Id. at 1973.
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The lack of a majority opinion raises the question of whether Till is
binding precedent.
The Supreme Court has said that "[w]hen a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds.' ' 269 The Court has since acknowledged that this test has been difficult to apply."' In this case,
as the dissent stated, "[elight Justices are in agreement that the rate of
interest set forth in the debtor's approved plan must include a premium
for risk."271 The difference is that the majority would require creditors
to prove any risk in addition to that contained in the prime rate, while
the dissent would presume that the creditor's calculation of risk at the
time it lent the money is correct. Whether or not the courts will be able
to find some narrow grounds of agreement on which to base future
decisions remains to be seen.
X.

THE SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT OF 2003

The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act of 2003 (the "Act")27 2 amended
the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act ("SSCRA")273 and was signed
into law in December 2003. The Act provides for "the temporary
suspension of judicial and administrative proceedings and transactions
that may adversely affect the civil rights of servicemembers during their
military service." 274 Bankruptcy is not excluded from the Act; on the
contrary, it is specifically invoked in one section. 5 Payment of an
active duty servicemember's life insurance policy premiums is guaranteed by the United States. 6 If the United States is obligated to act
on that guarantee, the servicemember will become indebted to the
United States. 7
"Such debt payable to the United States is not
dischargeable in bankruptcy proceedings."278
Another provision of the Act that may arise in the bankruptcy context
is the interest rate reduction. That provision became an issue in Baxter

269. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
270. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
271. 124 S. Ct. at 1978.
272. Pub. L. No. 108-189, 117 Stat. 2835 (2003).
273. 50 App. U.S.C. §§ 501-596 (1990 & Supp. 2003).
274. 117 Stat. at 2836, § 2(2).
275. Id. at 2854, § 407(b)(3).
276. Id. § 407(a)(1).

277. Id. § 407(b)(1).
278. Id. § 407(b)(3).
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v. Watson (In re Watson).27 9 The Chapter 13 debtor had two secured
claims to be paid at twelve percent interest. He was a member of the
Army National Guard and was called to active duty after his plan was
COfUi,,M,.

LL

trusteeL vutt
UgiLt aeuuuion in ne interest rates under

the SSCRA (the predecessor to the Act).280 The SSCRA provided that
the obligations of active duty servicemembers shall not accrue interest
at a rate greater than six percent unless the servicemember's ability to
pay a greater rate is unaffected by his military service."' After
determining that the debtor was covered by the SSCRA and that the
SSCRA applied to bankruptcy proceedings, the court concluded that the
rate reduction is mandatory unless the creditor proves "that the
serviceman is capable of paying the higher rate."28 2 In this case, the
creditor failed to meet its burden.2 3 The court ordered reduction of
the interest rate on the secured claims, with the proviso that the rate
would return to twelve
percent "immediately upon the Debtor['s] release
284
from active duty."

Bankruptcy practitioners should also be aware of an affidavit
requirement for default judgments. Pursuant to the Act, before a
plaintiff can receive a default judgment, he must submit an affidavit to
the court "stating whether or not the defendant is in military service and
showing necessary facts to support the affidavit; or... stating that the

279. 292 B.R. 441, 442 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003).
280. Id. at 442-43.
281. Id. at 443 (quoting 50 App. U.S.C. § 526). The amendments made some changes
to this provision. It now provides,
[a]n obligation or liability bearing interest at a rate in excess of 6 percent per year
that is incurred by a servicemember ...before the servicemember enters military
service shall not bear interest at a rate in excess of 6 percent per year during the
period of military service .... A court may grant a creditor relief from the
limitations of this section if, in the opinion of the court, the ability of the
servicemember to pay interest upon the obligation or liability at a rate in excess
of 6 percent is not materially affected by reason of the servicemember's military
service.
117 Stat. 2835, 2844, § 207(a)(1), (c).
282. 292 B.R. at 445. While the amendment did not appear to make significant
alterations to the language of the "interest rate" section, creditors may still rely on the
changes to argue that it is no longer clear who bears the burden of proof. Under the
SSCRA, the court only considered the debtor's ability to pay the higher interest rate "upon
application thereto by the obligee." 50 App. U.S.C. § 526. The amendment removed that
language. See suprm note 281. However, such a requirement may be implicit in the new
statute.
283. 292 B.R. at 445.
284. Id.
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plaintiff is unable to determine whether or not the defendant is in
military service."2 85
XI.

CONCLUSION

It is difficult to draw any broad themes from the cases decided over
the past year. And, notably, the Supreme Court has probably created
more questions than answers in the bankruptcy arena during its 20032004 term.Moreover, Congress is once again attempting to pass
bankruptcy reform legislation.2 86 So, interesting changes may be in
store for the future.

285. 117 Stat. at 2840 § 201(b)(1).
286. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 975,
108th Cong. (2003).

